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PRECONCEPTION INJURIES:
VIABLE EXTENSION OF PRENATAL INJURY
LAW OR INCONCEIVABLE TORT?
INTRODUCTION
Ideally, judicially created law both regulates and reflects social
mores. To maintain their integrity in the presence of constantly
changing societal contexts, courts must strike a delicate balance be-
tween creativity and continuity.' Judicial treatment of the prenatal
injury tort clearly exemplifies this nirvana of creative continuity.!
Initially, the common law was both resolute and consistent in its
denial of prenatal injury actions. Viewed as part of his mother, the
unborn child was denied legal recognition and, a fortiori was
neither owed a duty of care nor capable of stating a cause of action
for injuries sustained prior to live birth. The mid-1940's marked the
beginning of an abrupt judicial about-face which would bestow legal
personality first on the viable, and eventually on the merely conceived,
fetus.' This commendable extension of negligent tort law's compen-
1. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463
(1962).
2. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
3. See, e.g., Alliare v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Lipps
v. Milwaukee Electric R.R. & L. Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916); Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921). Contra, Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn. 320, 206
N.W. 650 (1925).
4. The following jurisdictions permit actions for prenatal injuries if the plain-
tiff is injured while viable and is subsequently born alive: Panogopoulous v. Martin,
295 F.Supp. 220 (D.W. Va. 1969) (applying state law); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F.Supp. 56
(D. Iowa 1960) (applying state law); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946);
Callahan v. Slavsky, 153 Colo. 291, 385 P.2d 674 (1963); Tursi v. New England Windsor
Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 11 A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, In-
c., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962);
Orange v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1969); Cooper v.
Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79
A.2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1959); Rainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Streggal v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d
557 (1953); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1849); Mollison v. Pomery, 205 Ore. 690, 291
P.2d 225 (1955); Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 161 S.E.2d 531 (1968); Hall v. Mur-
phy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc.,
210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d
288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14,
148 N.W.2d 107 (1907).
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satory protection to unborn children has progressed with unfor-
tunate obliviousness to the qualitatively and quantitatively impor-
tant claims of those injured before conception. This note addresses
this relatively unnoticed tort and explores the plausibility of causes
of action in negligence for injuries sustained prior to conception.
Preconception or genetic injuries are those injuries which an
individual sustains prior to conception as a result of damage to the
genetic structure of one or both of his parents or other ancenstor.6
For example, suppose a child is born deformed and proof exists that
this condition was caused years earlier when a doctor negligently
exposed the child's mother to unreasonable amounts of radiation
thereby altering the parent's genetic structure. The question arises
whether the child, as biological recepient of the damaged genes, may
maintain a negligence action against the doctor for his earlier
negligent conduct. This hypothetical elicits two basic characteristics
The following states permit actions for prenatal injuries if the plaintiff is con-
ceived when injured and is subsequently born alive: Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280
So. 2d 758 (1973) (wrongful death action); Justus v. Atchison, 126 Cal. Rptr. 150, 53 Cal.
App. 3d 556 (1976) (by statute); Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla.
1976); Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Daley
v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Torigian v. Watertown News Co.,
352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967) (wrongful death action); Womack v. Buckhorn, 384
Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108
(1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d
222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Super. Ct. 1976), affd, 46 L.W. 2326 (Dec. 12, 1977); Sinkler v.
Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222
(1966); Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). Recovery for
prenatal injuries was also allowed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(1970), in Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960).
The following states do not permit recovery for prenatal injuries: Mace v.
Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962) (applying state law); Hosty v. Moulton Water
Co., 39 Mont. 310, 102 P. 568 (1909); Drabbles v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d
229 (1951); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. (1953); Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435,
132 P.2d 114 (1942); Bouee v. Danville, 53 Vt. 1 (1880); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co.,
210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
The following states have no reported prenatal injury case: Arizona, Arkan-
sas, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming.
5. Note, Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some Interesting Problems
In Tort Law, 28 S.W.L.J. 414, 415 n.7 (1974).
Preconception injuries are the damages suffered by subsequent generations.
Although a potential defendant's negligent conduct caused changes or mutations in a
parent or ancestor, no harm is suffered by him or her. The harmful effects, therefore,
do not really become apparent until subsequent generations. Thus, unlike prenatal in-
juries where the unborn child is a separate entity when injured in the mother's womb,
preconception injuries are suffered before separate existence. See Note, Torts Prior to
Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REV. 706, 707 (1977).
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of the preconception injury tort; both the defendant's negligence and
the plaintiff-child's injuries occur before the child's conception.' The
example also raises several of the problems which are inherent in
the preconception injury action. These obstacles include difficulties
in proving causation7 and damages,' avoiding the applicable statute
of limitations,' and showing that the defendant owes a duty of care
6. This note is also applicable if a potential defendant's negligent conduct oc-
curred before the future plaintiffs conception, but no damage attaches until conception
or later. Thus the discussion is appropriate should a preconception tort give rise to
either an action for prenatal injuries or wrongful life. Id.
7. See, e.g., E. STASON, S. ESTEP & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 222 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as ATOMS]; Note, Radiation and Preconception Injuries: Some In-
teresting Problems in Tort Law, 28 S.W.L.J. 414, 418 (1974); Keyes & Horvath, Ap-
proaches to Liability for Remote Causes: The Low Level Radiation Example, 56 IOWA
L. REV. 531 (1971); "[A]s our knowledge of radiation exposure and genetic damage in-
creases, it may well prove possible to satisfy the causation-in-fact requirement."
ATOMS, supra at 203.
8. See generally Powell, Effects of Radiation on Mart, 12 VAND. L. REV. 81
(1958).
9. There is little disagreement that when the last of all the elements of a
tort necessary for the successful maintenance of an action occurs, the cause of action is
said to have accrued. See, e.g., Merrit v. Economy Dept. Store, 125 Ind. App. 560, 128
N.E.2d 279 (1955); Wabash County v. Pearson, 120 Ind. 462, 22 N.E. 134 (1889). In the
preconception injury action, the last element to occur will be damage.
The first problem for consideration is, therefore when does the damage occur.
If damage occurs at the moment of negligent impact, the statute of limitations will
begin to run before the potential plaintiffs conception. The result may often be that
these plaintiffs will be deprived of any cause of action not only before the damage was
discovered, but before they were conceived. On the other hand if damage is said to oc-
cur at birth, Justice Duckworth's theoretical caution in Hornbuckle v. Plantation Piper
Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956), becomes realistically applicable.
Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 169 (1949), a significant trend in courts' interpretation of limitations statutes
has developed. In holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued when his injuries
become apparent, the Supreme Court in Urie referred to "the traditional purposes of
statutes of limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims within a
specified period of time after notice of the invasion of legal rights." Id. at 170. One
author who has explored the aftermath and effect of Urie, has identified:
[A] significant trend has been developing in cases involving delayed
manifestation diseases or injuries caused by wrongful conduct which was
not known to the plaintiff at the time of the technical invasion of his legal
interests .... [A] person must have some notice of his cause of action, an
awareness either that he has suffered an injury or that another person
has committed a legal wrong which ultimately may result in harm to him
before the statute can begin to run.
Estep & Van Dyke, Radiation Injuries: Statute of Limitations Inadequacies in Tort
Cases, 62 MICH. L. REV. 753, 764 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Radiation Injuries]. To the
extent that this trend has been accurately characterized, the preconception injury may
be held to accrue when the genetically damaged child has notice of his injuries. Id at
et al.: Preconception Injuries: Viable Extention of Prenatal Injury or In
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to the yet unconceived child." Of these, only the existence of duty to
the preconceived child has received scant attention by courts and
commentators. This note addresses the issue of whether the
presence of a duty to unborn generations can and should be judicial-
ly recognized.
Three methods may be suggested by which to evaluate the
feasibility of extending judicial cognizance to the plaintiff injured
prior to his conception. The first approach examines whether
preconception injuries are compensable under existing theories of
prenatal injury tort law. This necessitates a thorough analysis of the
prenatal injury cause of action to determine the tests and theories
Which courts historically have applied when considering actions for
injuries occurring before birth. As existing theories present little
hope to the genetically damaged plaintiff, a following section ex-
plores the applicability of legal precedents to the unique preconcep-
tion injury cause of action. The dearth of precedent necessitates a
final discussion respecting the logic of existing prenatal injury
theories. The vast majority of courts has established points in intra-
uterine existence, typically viability1' or conception, 2 at which time
770. This has meant, in at least one jurisdiction, City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 S. 2d 306
(Fla. 1954), that the pre-birth injury cause of action accrues at birth.
A second interesting problem in the preconception injury action is whether
the preconceived entity will be considered under a disability. Legal disabilities
postpone the running of the statute and include infancy, insanity and imprisonment. If
preconception "existence" is not construed to be a disability, the inquiry reverts to the
discussion above as to the time at which damage occurs. If a disability is established it
will temporarily toll the running of the statute, and remain in most jurisdictions until
removed. Radiation Injuries, supra at 770.
Commentators have agreed that preconception "existence" should be con-
sidered, like infancy, a disability. One author has concluded:
[I]f recovery were to be allowed to children, deformed as a consequence of
the genetic damage suffered by a parent . . . the cause of action might be
tolled during his minority, providing no special limitation statute is
enacted to accommodate such new principles of liability.
Id. Infancy is widely recognized as a legal disability. Preconception existence, which is
logically a greater disability than infancy, should, therefore, also toll the running of the
limitation period.
10. The terms "preconception injuries," "pre-birth injuries," "prenatal in-
juries," and "preconceived child" are difficult to define. For the purpose of clarity,
preconception injuries describe the damage which the unborn child suffers before con-
ception. Prenatal injuries will be defined as injuries which the unborn child received at
any point from the moment of conception to birth. Pre-birth injuries is used as in-
cluding the entire spectrum of injuries which may occur before birth; therefore, pre-
birth injuries encompass both prenatal and preconception injuries. The unborn "entity"
before conception will be referred to as the preconceived or unconceived child.
11. See note 4 supra.
12. See note 4 supra.
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a duty of care toward the unborn child arises. An attempt is made
to expose the illogic and injustice of such "point-picking" theories
and to suggest a more rational approach to the pre-birth and pre-
conception injury tort.
The discussion presupposes that proof of causation of a
genetically damaged plaintiffs injuries exists and that he is able to
avoid the applicable state statute of limitations. Furthermore, it is
essential to recognize that the cause of action is brought by the
genetically damaged plaintiff after birth on his own behalf. Thus,
the issues narrow to whether this living plaintiff will be able to
establish that at the moment of injury before his conception, he was
owed a duty of care by the allegedly negligent party. As the follow-
ing section suggests, the state of the law at present will deny the
preconception injury cause of action because, as a matter of law, no
duty is owed the unborn child before conception.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE-THEORIES OF PRE-BIRTH INJURIES
As preconception injury cases arise, the willingness of courts
to recognize a cause of action may depend on the degree to which
the genetically damaged plaintiff is able to fit his claim into the
judicial reasoning consistently invoked in pre-birth injury actions. It
is, therefore, appropriate to examine past cases in order to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff injured before conception can establish
the sufficiency of his cause of action under accepted judicial theories
of the pre-birth injury tort.
The Initial American View
The most famous and influential prenatal injury case, Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northampton,3 initiated in 1884 a sixty year period
in which courts would consistently dismiss actions for injuries occur-
ring before birth. The Dietrich case arose when a woman who was
four months pregnant fell on a negligently maintained highway. The
woman miscarried and her prematurely born child died within fif-
teen minutes.1' Justice Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, summarily refused to recognize the death action
brought by the administrator of the dead child's estate:
If we should assume ... that a man might owe a civil duty
and incur a conditional prospective liability in tort to one
not yet in being ... we should then be confronted by the
13. 52 Am. Rep. 242, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
14. Id. at 15.
19771
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question ... whether an infant dying before it was able to
live separated from its mother could be said to [be] ... a
person recognized by the law as capable of having a locus
standi in court .... Taking all the foregoing considera-
tions into account, and further, that, as the unborn child
was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, any
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered
for at all was recoverable by her ...."
While Holmes did not clearly indicate the precise reason for denying
the cause of action, commentators agree that the dismissal rested on
three grounds: lack of precedent, the nonexistence of a person under
the applicable death statute, and the absence of any duty owed the
unborn child who was merely part of his mother. 6
The reasoning in Dietrich, although clearly directed at the con-
struction of a wrongful death statute, was subsequently accepted as
authority for the proposition that the surviving child could not main-
tain a cause of action for prenatal injuries. 7 For sixty years,
Dietrich was consistently cited as precedent for the common law
refusal to cloak the unborn child with the legal personality which
would have enabled him to bring his own cause of action after birth.
Subsequent judicial decisions contributed further justifications
for denying the prenatal injury cause of action. Numerous courts
dismissed these claims due to the difficulty in establishing a causal
relationship between the defendant's tortious conduct and the injury
to the unborn child. 8 Other courts, equally concerned with the dif-
ficult causation issue, advanced their fears of increased litigation
and fictitious claims as justification for dismissal and suggested that
such actions must await legislative approval.' Early commentators
15. Id. at 16, 17. See, e.g., Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: Michigan Ex-
ercises its "Ghosts of the Past," 47 N.D. L. REV. 976, 977 (1972).
16. Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: Right of A Child Against Its
Mother, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 582, 584-85 (1976).
17. It would appear to be inappropriate to compare prenatal injury actions to
wrongful death actions. Compare 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967), with 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78
S.W.2d 944 (1935). No doubt the state of medical science in this period was such that
proof of causation-in-fact would be tenuous; nevertheless, this rationale for a court's
dismissal appears to be an unfounded intrusion on an issue typically left to the jury.
See also Stacy v. Kickerbacker Ice Co., 84 Wis. 614, 54 N.W. 1091 (1893).
19. See, e.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So.
566 (1926) (expressing fear of permitting recovery based on conjecture and specula-
tion).
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also approved dismissal based on such problems as intrafamilial
suits' and the transferability of defenses.2'
Based on these considerations, the initial view of American
courts respecting prenatal injuries was clearly against recognizing a
cause of action. For purposes of negligence law, the unborn child
was conclusively presumed to be part of his mother. Legal personali-
ty was held to attach only after live birth and, therefore, the unborn
child could be owed no duty of care. Thus, by definition, there was
no prenatal injury cause of action.
The no-recovery rule initiated by Dietrich did not go unnoticed
or uncriticized.' During the period following Dietrich, opposition
mounted and led courts to reconsider the merits of the prenatal in-
jury case and to eventually permit actions for injuries sustained by
the viable' unborn child.
The Viability Theory
The first inroad into the common law no-recovery rule found its
analytical roots in the influential dissent of Alliare v. St. Luke's
Hosp.2' The majority of the Alliare court denied the plaintiff-child's
prenatal injury cause of action for lack of duty on the authority of
Dietrich.5 The dissent in Alliare questioned the majority's reliance
on Dietrich and stressed that the plaintiff had sustained damage
while viable.26 The dissent agreed that the four month old, nonviable
fetus in Dietrich was part of his mother and, therefore, was owed no
duty of care. It stressed, however, that once viable, an unborn child
was no longer part of his mother but was by definition capable of in-
dependent existence. Thus, separate existence and a fortiori legal
personality were held to attach at that point in intrauterine develop-
ment when the fetus was able to live outside his mother's womb.
Once viable, the fetus could independently come within the zone of
20. See generally Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: Right of A Child
Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 582 (1976).
21. The problem in this respect is whether a pregnant woman's contributory
negligence will bar her child's suit for prenatal injuries.
22. See, e.g., Winfield, The Unborn Child, 4 U.TORONTo L.J. 275 (1942).
23. Viability may be defined as the twenty-fourth week of gestation although
some fetuses may be viable before the twentieth week. Elwood & Thompson, Fetal
Viability, 1 LANCET 862 (1975).
24. 184 Il. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
25. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REV. 570, 588 (1965).
26. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638, 641-642 (1900).
1977]
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danger created by a negligent party and, subject to live birth and
proof of causation, could recover for his injuries."
The dissenter's reasoning passed unnoticed until fifty years
later when the District Court for the District of Columbia permitted
a malpractice action in Bonbrest v. Kotz" for injuries sustained by a
fetus during natural childbirth. The Bonbrest court reasoned:
True [the viable fetus] is in the womb, but it is capable
now of extrauterine life-and while dependent for its con-
tinued development on sustenance derived from its
mother, it is not a "part" of the mother in the sense of a
constituent element - as that term is generally
understood. Modern medicine is replete with cases of liv-
ing children being taken from dead mothers."
In holding that a child could maintain an action for prenatal injuries
if viable when injured and subsequently born alive, Bonbrest proved
to be of overwhelming precedential importance.' Dissatisfied with
the harshness of the Dietrich rule denying any remedy for the
prenatal wrong, subsequent decisions began to permit actions for
prenatal injuries to unborn children if viable when damaged. Based
on the analysis in Bonbrest, recovery in these cases stemmed from
recognition that the viable fetus, because separable from his mother,
was an independent legal personality and was owed a separate duty
of care.
The separability analysis in Bonbrest, although extending com-
pensatory protection to the viable fetus, served to assure the
dismissal of actions for injuries sustained by nonviable unborn
children. With Bonbrest as authority, later decisions invoked three
grounds for the denial of actions for prenatal injuries to a pre-viable
fetus: the lack of the nonviable fetus' separate existence from his
mother and, therefore, the lack of a legal personality to which a du-
ty could be owed;"' the increased difficulty in establishing proof of
27. Id.
28. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
29. Id at 140.
30. Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: Michigan Exercises Its "Ghosts of
the Past", 47 N.D. L. REv. 976, 979 (1972). See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Patti, 415 II. 496, 114
N.E.2d 271 (1953); Damasiewicz v. Garsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Co., 152
Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225
(1955).
31. See generally White, The Right to Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA.
L. REv. 383 (1952).
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causation as injuries approached the moment of conception; 2 and the
fear of fictitious claims.'
These justifications for dismissing actions for injuries to pre-
viable unborn children were promptly attacked as illfounded and il-
logical." The Bonbrest viability theory represented a monumental
step towards remedying the prenatal wrong and is today followed
by a numerical majority of courts;" nevertheless by halting compen-
sory protection at viability, it was criticized as presenting, "the
potential for working injustice,""' and, "seeking to eliminate in-
justice by being half just." 7 Such criticisms gained judicial accep-
tance eight years later when the New York Supreme Court Ap-
pellate Division" examined and rejected the rationale of the viability
theory for denying recovery to the nonviable fetus and initiated yet
another phase of prenatal tort recovery which granted legal per-
sonality to the unborn child from the moment of conception.
The Biological-Separability Theory
In 1953 Bonbrest's newly established viability theory was suc-
cessfully attacked in Kelly v. Gregory." Allowing the plaintiff-child's
cause of action for injuries sustained while nonviable, the Kelly
court stated:
While the point at which the fetus becomes viable has
been of usefulness in drawing some legal distinctions, the
underlying problem that has usually troubled the judges
who have written on the subject of recovery for prenatal
injuries, has been in fixing the point of legal separability
from the mother .... We know something more of the ac-
tual process of conception and foetal development now
than when some of the common law cases were decided;
32. See generally McBride & Norvall, The Extension of Tort Liability in the
Field of Prenatal Injuries, 26 INs. COUNSEL J. 148 (1959).
33. Id
34. See, e.g., Muse & Spinella, Right of Infant to Recover for Prenatal Injury,
36 VA. L. REV. 611 (1950); Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts: Actions for Wrongful
Death, 15 RUT. L. REV. 61 (1950); Note, Liability for Injuries Negligently Inflicted on
Viable Unborn Child 63 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1949); Note, Tort Actions for Injuries to
Unborn Infants, 3 VAND. L. REv. 283 (1950); Note, The Law of Prenatal Injuries, 37 U.
COLO. L. REv. 271 (1965). See also Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 249 (1960).
35. See note 4 supra.
36. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff. 63 MICH. L. REv. 579, 589 (1965).
37. Note, A New Theory in Prenatal Injuries: The Biological Approach. 26
FORD. L. REV. 684, 688 (1958)
38. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
39. Id.
19771
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and what we know makes it possible to demonstrate clear-
ly that separability begins at conception.
The mother's biological contribution from conception on is
nourishment and protection; but the foetus has become a
separate organism and remains so throughout its life.
That it may not live if its protection and nourishment are
cut off earlier than the viable stage of its develpment is
not to destroy its separability; it is rather to describe con-
ditions under which life will not continue.'
Utilizing reasoning similiar to Bonbrest, the Kelly court determined
the point before birth at which legal personality attaches on the
basis of the unborn child's separability from his mother. However,
unlike Bonbrest, Kelly acknowledged that due to the tremendous
progress in medical knowledge, conception and not viability marked
the beginning of that separability.'1
Although not discussed in Kelly three catalytic developments
in the 1940's lend credence to the court's reliance on expanding
scientific knowledge.'2 A German measles epidemic in Australia,
research on the inheritance of the Rh factor in fetal blood, and the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki each spurred research which
disproved earlier scientific positions and established conception as
the beginning of the unborn child's separability.
While still a minority view, the modern trend is clearly toward
a rejection of Bonbrest's viability theory and, pursuant to Kelly,
toward the allowance of actions for any post-conception injuries."
Eight states' have adopted the biological-separability theory and
have accepted conception as the point at which the unborn child's
legal personality begins. These courts have, furthermore, rejected
the contention advanced by jurisdictions following Bonbrest's viabili-
40. Id. at 697.
41. See generally Note. The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law
Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962); Note, A New Theory in
Prenatal Injuries: The Biological Approach, 26 FoRD. L. REV. 684 (1958).
42. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal
Injuries, 110 PA. L. REV. 554 (1962).
43. Id.
44. See note 4 supra.
45. The eight states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
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ty theory, that increased problems in proving the cause of injuries
to nonviable fetuses precludes recovery."
Legal commentators, nearly unanimous in support of the
biological-separablility theory, have also attacked the viabiltiy
theory as irrational and illogical. Several commentators have ad-
vanced the intriguing argument that since criminal and property law
recognize the unborn child's separate legal existence from the point
of conception, courts should also recognize the separate existence of
the conceived child for the purpose of redressing torts.' Another
46. See generally Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law
Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962).
Furthermore, any difficulty in establishing a causal relationship between a
defendant's tortious conduct and injuries to a nonviable fetus is irrelevant in determin-
ing the sufficiency of a cause of action; the problems in proving the cause of prenatal
injuries are not substantially more different or difficult than in typical negligence or
workmen's compensation cases. Estep & Fergutson, Legal Liability for Genetic In-
juries From Radiation, 24 LA. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1963).
47. These analogies to property and criminal law serve useful explanatory
functions but falter in two respects. First, criminal, property and tort law are not
directed at, nor do they effectuate, the same societal function. The mere assertion that
property and criminal law are operative from the moment of conception is not in itself
sufficient justification for tort law following suit. Second and more importantly, assum-
ing these other areas of the law do serve some appropriate analogous function to the
scope of tort protection, past commentators have consistently failed to recognize the
extent to which these other areas of the law have afixed themselves into the unborn
child's "existence" before birth. Thus, alhough past commentators have suggested that
other areas of the law "recognize" the unborn child from the moment of conception,
property, contract and intentional tort law have in fact "recognized" the unborn child
before conception.
In light of these criticisms, the following will elaborate a few examples of
judicial excursions into preconception "existence." The purpose of this analysis is not
to conclusively establish that negligent tort law does or should extend its protection
via duty to the preconceived "entity." Rather, the ultimate focus is whether the
preconception "realm" is of appropriate ethical or moral concern as exemplified by its
treatment in other areas of the law. Thus, if duty concepts serve in part as a rough
mirroring of the general populus' concensus as to the extent which a party should com-
pensate those injured by his conduct, it may be helpful to establish initially that
preconception "existence" has been the legitimate concern of many other facets of the
law.
Almost a century ago the New York Court of Appeals in Piper v. Hoard, 107
N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887), considered whether a twenty-one year old girl could
recover for financial damages as the result of a fraud perpetrated on her mother
before her own conception. In permitting the girl's recovery, the Piper court held in
part:
It is true, the plaintiff was not born when the fraudulent representations
were made. Still they were made by the defendant to the plaintiff's
mother ... and, if they had been true, the plaintiff would have been the
owner of this particular property. In this way she is the very person in-
jured by the fraud, and although not individually in the mind of the defen-
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plausable argument against retention of the viability theory stresses
that as medical knowledge has expended in the past few decades, it
has become increasingly apparent that a fetus is most susceptible to
dant when he perpetrated that fraud . .. she belongs to .the class which
defendants had in contemplation .... Why should not the plaintiff be en-
titled to hold the defendant to his representations?
Id at 629. The Piper court was apparently not the least concerned "with some
abstract ontological proposition as to the instant a human being becomes a person."
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1963).
Neither birth, viability nor conception served as appropriate cut-off points before
which the denial of a cause of action is compelled. The Piper court, therefore, recogniz-
ed the financial wrong, traced that wrong to the defendant's fraud, and provided the
remedy, all without any great concern as to the plaintiffs existence at the time of the
tort. Notably, duty analysis is not appropriate in the intentional tort sphere, but the
societal concern for the preconceived child has, nevertheless, in part warranted the
judicial extension exemplified in Piper.
Contract law, specifically in the area of domestic relations, has also refused to
halt the effectuation of its societal function at the moment of conception. A common
example generally accepted today is that rights secured in an antenuptial marriage
settlement to future children will be protected from impairment, 42 AM. JUR. 2d, In-
fants § 2 (1969). Thus, an antenuptial marriage contract anticipating divorce will be
held void as against public policy, Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970). The
legitimate judicial concern for the protection of future children serves as the basis for
this determination: "The law recognizes an equitable interest in possible future
children, who at the creation of the right have no physical existence whatever." 42 AM.
JUR. 2d Infants § 2 (1969). The plaintiff in some future preconception injury case could,
therefore, argue that if courts are legitimately concerned with my being labelled as l-
legitimate due to a contract entered into before my conception, how is it they express
no concern for debilitating preconception injuries leaving me financially and physically
handicapped for life.
Two final examples of courts' equitable interest in possible future children may
be given in the area of property law. At common law the doctrine of shifting descent
governed the case of an heir born after the death of an intestate. The doctrine produc-
ed the following results:
[A]n heir born at any time after the death of the intestate, whether con-
ceived or not at the time of the latter's death would be entitled to share.
Thus, if the nearest intestate successor at the death of the intestate was
his sister, and the parents (who could not inherit realty at common law)
also survived, the sister's intestate share was liable at any time to be
divested partially by the birth of other sister's (who would share equally
with her as coparceners), or entirely by the birth of a brother (who would
take everything under primogeniture and preference for males).
A. GULLIVER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATITUOUS TRANSFERS 100 (1967). Thus, the
common law developed a doctrine by which the right of preconceived "entities" to
share in intestate distribution was protected.
Another more modern example of the presence of property law in the
preconception "realm" is the contingent remainder to unborn children. A hypothetical
may assist in describing this example. If one wills land to X for life, remainder to X's
children, courts will not permit X to sell his life estate in fee simple. The concern is
with the future rights of unconceived or unborn children who may take after X's
death. See generally Note, Unborn Parties in Property Litigation, 48 HARv. L. REv.
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environmental influences during the early stages of pregnancy, par-
ticularly during the first trimester." By applying the viability
theory, courts would, therefore, limit recovery to the atypical fetal
injury while rejecting the more substantial and probable claims of
those alleging pre-viability injuries. A final objection to retention of
the analysis in Bonbrest is that viability has not been uniformly
defined.' Many variable factors such as age, weight and en-
vironmental conditions comprise determinations of viability. Pro-
blems, therefore, become apparent in a trial wherein a court must
1001 (1935); Roberts, Virtual Representation in Action Affecting Future Interests, 30
ILL. L. REV. 580 (1936); Greese v. Stadiem, 198 N.C. 445, 152 S.E. 398 (1930). The policy
basis in these areas of the law, therefore, warrants their presence and concern with
the unborn child before conception.
Additional examples of legitimate social concerns over the health of the child
before conception are also readily available outside the direct oversight of the judicial
process. An entire new scientific field has already evolved in which prospective
parents may receive expert consultation on the possibilities of their future children
having congenital defects. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that prospective
mothers should undergo frequent health checks and take advantage of such procedures
as vaccination against German measles before becoming pregnant:
[Vaccination of these prospective mothers] is not proposed as a protection
of the woman herself, against what is usually a scarcely noticable illness;
its purpose is purely and simply that of protecting an unborn, unknown
individual against a small but identifiable probability that it will be born
with a congenital defect.
R. MORISON, QUALITY OF HUMAN LIFE, BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 333 (New York
1976).
The individual basis for this concern of the unborn child's preconception "ex-
istence are varied and numerous. Many, like the World Health Organization, speak of
the right of the infant to begin life outside the mother in a healthy state, Id. On the
opposite end of the spectrum are the utilitarian concerns of those who emphasize the
tremendous social costs of maintaining the products of an unfavorable preconception
environment, Id. Between these two views are those who base their concern for a
favorable preconception existence on the fact that the results for both the future child
and the mother are "better." Id.
Regardless of the underlying motives, the relevant point is the basic societal
concern for the preconceived child. It is submitted, therefore, that our society has a
distinct and definable interest in the preconceived "entity" as exemplified by the
presence and influence of both the law and individual concerns in preconception en-
vironment.
48. Wilson, Experimental Studies on Congenital Malformations, 10 J. CHRON.
DIs. 111, 119 (1959).
49. H. SMITH, ETHICS AND THE NEW MEDICINE 19 (1970) (viability beings from
the twenty-eight week of gestation); J. MORRISON. FETAL AND NEONATAL PATHOLOGY
99-100 (1963) (stressing that the length and weight of the fetus are better factors to
consider than fetal age); J. WILLIAMS, OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971) (viability occurs
during the twentieth to twenty-eighth week of gestation); Gruenwold, Growth of the
Human Fetus, 94 AM. J. OF OBSTET. & GYN. 1112 (1966) (different racial groups reach
viability at different times).
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determine the moment at which viability commences; even among
medical authorities no consensus of agreement exists.5
By permitting actions for injuries to both the viable and non-
viable fetus, the biological-separability theory has received wide-
spread approval. With legal personality attaching at conception, the
conceived child can be owed a duty of care and, subject to live birth
and proof of causation, recovery for antecedent injuries. A small
minority of states, 1 while agreeing with this result, has never-
theless rejected the internal analysis of the biological-separability
theory. The following discussion addresses those few states which
maintain that the roots of recovery lie not in scientific determina-
tions of separability, but in the ideal of "justice".
The Right-to-be-Born-Sound Theory
Three states" have extended judicial cognizance to the unborn
child from the moment of conception, not on separability analysis,
but on the child's right to be born with a sound mind and body. The
most succinct delineation of this "right-to-be-born-sound" theory was
reiterated in the Rhode Island case of Sylvia v. Gobeille.3 In ruling
that the plaintiff-child had stated a cause of action for injuries
resulting from a' physician's negligent failure to prescribe any
remedy for her pregnant mother, notwithstanding the physician's
knowledge of the mother's exposure to German Measles, the Sylvia
court stated:
While we could as sometimes been done elsewhere, justify
our rejection of the viability concept on the medical fact
that a fetus becomes a living human being from the mo-
ment of conception, we do so not on the authority of the
biologist but because we are unable logically to conclude
that a claim for an injury inflicted prior to viability is any
less meritorious than one sustained after .... Justice re-
quires that the principle be recognized that a child has a
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body."
50. Note, A New Theory in Prenatal Injuries: The Biological Approach, 26
FoRD. L. REV. 684, 688 (1958).
51. Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971); Smith v. Bren-
nan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222
(1966).
52. See cases cited in note 51 supra.
53. 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966).
54. Id at 223-224.
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Thus, unlike those courts which accepted the biological-separability
theory, the Sylvia court did not find a cause of action on the basis of
acceptance of scientific advances. The unborn child was owed a duty
of care from the moment of conception and could recover at birth
for any post-conception injuries not on the authority of the scientist,
but because an undefined judicial sense of "justice" had so man-
dated.
Tort protection has been extended by the biological-
separability and right-to-be-born-sound theories to the unborn child
from the moment of conception. The following section explores an in-
teresting group of cases which have dealt with claims for injuries
sustained by the unborn child at the moment of conception.
Wrongful Life Actions
Wrongful life cases involve the unusual claim that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover damages because the defendent's negligence
led proximately to the plaintiffs very existence.' Thus, unlike the
biological-separability and right-to-be-born-sound theories which
"protect" the unborn child from the time of conception, the theory
advanced by the wrongful life plaintiff is that tort law's compen-
satory protection is also present at conception.
Typical of these cases is Zepeda v. Zepeda,N where an il-
legitimate child sued his father seeking damages "for the depriva-
tion of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to
have a legal father, to inherit from his paternal ancestors and for be-
ing stigmatized as a bastard."57 The Zepeda court had little trouble
in labelling as tortious the conduct of the defendant-father in induc-
ing the illigetimate child's mother into having sexual relations by
fraudulent promises of marriage." More important was the court's
finding that a tort could be inflicted upon a being simultaneously
with its conception:
The case at bar seems to be the natural result of the pre-
sent course of the law permitting actions for physical in-
juries ever closer to the moment of conception. In point of
time it goes just a little further. The significance of this
course to us is this: if recovery is to be permitted an in-
fant one month after conception, why not if injured one
55. See generally Annot. 22 A.L.R.3d 1441 (1968).
56. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 945 (1963).
57. Id. at 851.
58. Id. at 852-53.
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week after, one minute after, or at the moment of concep-
tion? ... If there is human life, proved by subsequent bir-
th, then that human life has the same rights at the time of
conception as it has at any time thereafter."
Recognizing the tort at conception to be the logical and just
outgrowth of the expansion of prenatal tort law, the Zepeda court
nevertheless denied the plaintiff-child's action for reasons of public
policy.' As subsequent wrongful-life cases emerged, these public
policy arguments became more well-defined. Included among those
arguments against the illegitimate child's action were: (1) the lack of
precedent," (2) the impossibility of measuring damages which would
necessarily be based on the difference between illegitimate ex-
istence and non-existence,"2 (3) the fear of flooding courts with
similar claims by the hundreds of thousands of others stigmatized as
illegitimates," and (4) the policies against intrafamily suits and abor-
tions."
With such persuasive arguments against recovery, few
wrongful life actions have been allowed." Notably, the arguments
against recovery have absolutely no bearing or applicability to the
moment at which the "injury" arises. Although cases are dismissed
because of these public policy arguments, courts, nevertheless,
recognize that an action could be maintained within the present
state of the law for injuries which are suffered at conception.
Prenatal tort law, in the context of these wrongful life actions,
now encompasses all stages of prenatal "existence." As previously
noted," the history of prenatal injury law may aptly be described as
59. Id.
60. Id. at 858-59.
61. Note, Torts - Illegitimacy - Bastard Has Cause of Action Against State
for Negligently Permitting Her Mother's Rape, Causing Plaintiffs Illegitimacy, 41
N.Y.U. L. REv. 212 (1966).
62. Note, Unusual Cases of Tort Liability, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1964).
63. Note, Compensation for the Harmful Effects of Illegitimacy. 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 127 (1966).
64. Note, Illegitimate Child Denied Recovery Against Father For Wrongful
Life, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1005 (1964).
65. See generally Brantley, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New
Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140 (1976).
This author makes an essential distinction between wrongful birth (suit by
parent) and wrongful life (suit by child) actions. The only wrongful life actions thus far
permitted are Jorgensen v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973), and Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Super. Ct. 1976).
66. See note 59 supra.
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a distinct judicial course permitting actions for injuries sustained
closer and closer to the moment of conception. This judicial course
of extending protection to unborn children progressed through
roughly four stages. Initially, recovery was denied for any prenatal
injury, typically on the authority of Dietrich.7 Under the viability
theory" initiated by the Bonbrest court in 1946, legal personality
was held to attach when the fetus became capable of independent
existence; therefore, once viable, the unborn child was owed a duty
of care and was able at birth to state a cause of action. Kelly and
subsequent cases accepting the biological-separability theory," ex-
tended protection to unborn children before viability to the moment
of conception by reasoning that legal personality existed at the mo-
ment the unborn child is biologically-separable from his mother.
Courts adhering to the "right-to-be-born-sound" theory"0 also held
that the unborn child was owed a duty of care from the moment of
conception, but justified this extension on undefined notions of
justice. Rounding out the historical treatment of the pre-birth injury
tort are those wrongful life cases"' which arguably afford the unborn
child protection at conception. The central question remains whether
this distinct judicial course of extending protection to unborn
children must halt at viability or conception, or whether the three
basic theories of prenatal injury law contain sufficient internal flex-
ibility to remedy the preconception wrong.
PRECONCEPTION INJURIES-A ROUGH ROAD TO RECOVERY UNDER
EXISTING THEORIES
With nearly all states" following either the viability, biological-
separability or right-to-be-born-sound theories which bestow legal
personality on the unborn only after a specific point in pre-birth "ex-
istence," the genetically damaged plaintiff will encounter substantial
impediments to establishing the sufficiency of his cause of action.
Under the viability and biological-separability theories, the plaintiff
must show his requisite "separability" at the time of his preconcep-
tion injury. Should such an action arise in a state adhering to the
right-to-be-born-sound theory, the genetically damaged plainfiff will
need to argue that this "right" also exists before conception. This
section analyzes the tenuous arguments to which the plaintiff in-
67. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
69. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
70. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
72. See note 4 supra.
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jured before conception must resort under these historically rooted
theories in order to establish the required duty of care.
Preconception Injuries Under the Viability Theory
In all probability the preconception injury action will fail to
state a cause of action under the viability theory. The viability ap-
proach requires that the potential plaintiff be injured while capable
of extrauterine existence."' Without this independence the unborn
child is held to be without legal personality, and therefore, the
potential defendant will have owed him no duty of reasonable con-
duct. Based on this analysis, the unborn child before conception ap-
pears to be manifestly "unviable." Not only is the unborn child in-
capable of extrauterine existence before conception, but his in-
trauterine existence as a fertilized ovum has not yet begun.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff injured before conception may still
satisfy the prerequisites of duty under the viability theory. Courts
adhering to the viability theory do not define "viability" uniformly."'
Some courts profess to accept as viable the unborn child capable of
independent existence with artificial aid.75 Thus, if at the particular
moment of injury an unborn child could have lived apart from his
mother even by artificial means, he may be considered "viable" and,
therefore, owed a duty of care.
In a jurisdiction applying the viable theory as defined above, a
child injured before conception has a tenuous, yet extremely pro-
vacative argument in favor of the sufficiency of his cause of action.
This argument centers on revolutionary advances in medical science
which alter the natural process of human conception. More
specifically, the plaintiff-child alleging preconception injuries might
argue that such Orwellion techniques as the test tube baby" or clon-
73. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
74. See note 49 supra.
75. See generally Note, Liability for Injuries Negligently Inflicted on Viable
Unborn Child 63 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1949); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on
the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962).
76. See generally Oakley, Test Tube Babies: Proposals For Legal Regulation
of New Methods of Human Conception and Prenatal Development 8 FAMILY L.Q. 385
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Oakley]; E. EDWARDS & S. STEPTOE, BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
EMPRYO TRANSFER, CIBA FOUNDATION. SYMPOSIUM ON LEGAL AND OTHER ASPECTS OF AR.
TIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONAR (A.I.D.) AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 16 (1972)
77. Test tube babies may be defined as the being (human or animal) which is
conceived and "produced" under laboratory conditions rather than in the mother's
womb. See generally Oakley, supra note 76; G. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB 32
(1968); A. ROSENFELD, THE SECOND GENESIS 138-39 (1969); Brodie, The New Biology and
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ing 8 render the unborn child capable of extrauterine existence with
artificial aid before conception. The plaintiff injured before concep-
tion could, therefore, submit that the age of the test tube baby will
artificially replace the absolute necessity of a human carrier of un-
born children. The logical extension of this questionable argument is
that at all times before birth and also prior to conception, the un-
born child is capable of artificially aided extrauterine existence and
is, therefore, viable and a fortiori owed a duty of care.
This test tube baby argument is obviously a tenuous stretching
of the viability theory. Clearly judicial acceptance is conditioned on
the willingness of courts to keep abreast of, and even anticipate, ad-
vances in medical science."9 It should, nevertheless, be remembered
that when the viability theory was initially attacked as extending
the Holmes' rationale in Dietrich too far, the basis of that extension
was the authority of the scientist.' If medical knowledge has pro-
gressed to the point at which the entire process of pre-birth "ex-
istence" may be monitored in a laboratory with no need whatsoever
of a human carrier, the requisite capacity for extrauterine existence
and viability exists.
As this analysis indicates, the internal reasoning of the viabili-
ty theory suffers from its utilization of the constantly expanding
scientific definition of viability. Medical science is not stagnant;81 the
developments and revolutionary advances in scientific knowledge
have made extrauterine existence possible at earlier points in pre-
birth "existence." If the point of viability is defined pursuant to
ever-increasing medical knowledge, courts adhering to the viability
theory must accept those scientific advances, which arguably result
in the possibility of extrauterine existence before conception.
the Prenatal Chil 9 J. FAMILY 391 (1970); Garney, The New Biology and the Future
of Man, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 273 (1968); Note, Criminal Law-Abortion-The
"Morning-After Pill" and Other Pre-Implantion Birth Control Methods and the Law,
46 ORE. L. REv. 211 (1967); ; Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Arificial Insemina-
tion and the Law, 67 MICH. L. REv. 127 (1968).
78. Cloning is the aggregate of the asexually produced progeny of an in-
dividual whether natural (as the products of repeated fission of a protozoan) or other-
wise (as in the propogation of a particular plant by budding or by cuttings through
many vegetative generations). To oversimplify, cloning is the process by which an in-
dividual is conceived and "produced" from the cell of a living being. Test tube babies
and clones are, therefore, conceived and "produced" under laboratory conditions
without the aid of a human carrier. The unborn child is thus totally separable from his
"mother."
79. Future advances in science are clearly not binding or persuasive on courts.
80. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
81. ATOMS, supra note 7, at 3.
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Similar problems will exist when the plainfiff injured before concep-
tion brings his claim in a jurisdiction aligned with the biological-
separability theory.
Preconception Injuries Under the Biological-Separability Theory
In order to state a cause of action under the biological-
separation theory, the plaintiff injured before conception must again
resort to the test tube baby or cloning arguments. Under the
biological-separability theory, after conception has occurred the un-
born child is viewed as a separate legal personality owed a separate
duty of care and capable of bringing an action after birth for any
negligently inflicted post-conception injuries. Recognizing the
prevalent role which medical science has played in the analysis of
the biological-separability theory,' the ultimate question may be for-
mulated; has science progressed to the point at which the unborn
child before conception may be considered scientifically separable
from his mother?
Upon making the tenuous assumptions that test tube babies
and human cloning are within the present competence of medical
science and that the judiciary is willing to keep apace with these
revolutionary advances, the plaintiff injured before conception could
establish the requisite biological-separability based on the ability of
the scientist to intervene in life's developmental processes back to
the actual point of a being's biological origin-his genetic struc-
ture." Medical advances in the recent past have enabled the scien-
tist to detect and predict metabolic disorders, genetic defects, and
chromosomal aberations in the unborn child before conception." In-
deed, an entire new scientific field has evolved which gives expert
genetic counseling to those contemplating having children. Based on
these enormous medical advances which have made possible not on-
ly direct manipulation of future childrens' preconception existence,
but also the increased competency of genetic counselors in predic-
ting the health of a future child, it could be argued that the unborn
child is biologically-separable before conception and, therefore, a
legal personality to which a duty of care is owed. It is undeniably
82. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
83. It would appear that in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d
849, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 945 (1963), the court did in fact recognize that life can be
traced to one's genetic structure.
84. See generally Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocetesis, 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 92 (1974); Early Diagnosis of Human Genetic Defects: Scientific and Ethical
Considerations, in FOGARTY INrL CENTER PROCEEDINGS n.6 (1971).
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true that science recognizes that in the natural course of human
development, the unborn child is separable from the moment of con-
ception." It is, nevertheless, equally true that in the era of test tube
babies and cloning, the scientist is capable of artificially altering and
manipulating this natural process of pre-birth existence and thereby
making the unborn child separable before conception. Unlike the
scientific arguments which must be advanced to establish the suffi-
ciency of the preconception injury cause of action under the viability
or biological-separability theories, a plaintiffs ability to state a
cause of action under the right-to-be-born-sound theory for
preconception injuries will depend largely on arguments which focus
on undefined conceptualizations of "justice."
Preconception Injuries Under the Right-To-Be-Born-Sound Theory
It would appear that the preconception injury action could
more easily be incorporated into the right-to-be-born-sound theory
than into either the viability or biological-separability approaches.
Those few jurisdictions which apply the right-to-be-born-sound
theory have superficially skimmed over any duty considerations and
rested their recognition of the prenatal injury action on the "future
right" of the unborn child from the moment of conception to begin
life as a normally functioning being." Thus, this future right at-
taches to the unborn child at conception thereby enabling him at
birth to state a cause of action for any post-conception injuries and
confront the jury with his causation and negligence arguments. The
ultimate difficulty with this theory is that the theory's conclusion is
the extent of its analysis. These decisions justify neither why the
right should exist from conception, nor why it should not exist
before conception.
Strict application of this right-to-be-born-sound theory will
result in dismissal of the preconception injury action; yet, this
dismissal is inconsistent with the reasoning of those courts which
adhere to this theory. These courts do not speak of the unborn
child's legal personality; rather, focus is centered on the unquestion-
ed right of the living child to begin existence as a sound being. With
recovery supposedly rooted in undefined notions of "justice," the
question arises whether "justice" dictates conditioning the rights of
living beings on the moment at which injuries are sustained. If the
basic aim of the right-to-be-born-sound theory is to enable all per-
sons the equal opportunity to begin life as normal healthy beings,
85. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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this protection should not be refused the unborn child before concep-
tion. Where is the magic in conception that one second after, the un-
born child has the right to be born sound, yet one second before, he
remains totally unprotected?" True, there is something more after
conception. Once the ovum is fertilized, the process of life has begun
and absent any internal or external problems, a living being will
result. Nevertheless, both the fertilized ovum and gene represent
the potential of life." Conception, like viability and birth, is
therefore, a step in pre-birth existence. The question then arises
why the unborn child is afforded the judicial protection of this
future right during only a portion of existence before birth. As one
author has responded:
What does it benefit a person to know that he is pro-
tected against unjustifiable personal injuries as soon as he
is born where the absence of such protection during his
prenatal stages may result in his never appreciating those
rights because of deformity or mental underdevelopment
associated with conduct of others during the prenatal
period?"
With "justice" dictating judicial protection of the unborn child, such
barriers as conception should bow to the paramount right of unborn
children in all stages of pre-birth existence to a sound beginning in
life.
The primary difficulty with acceptance of this analysis is skep-
ticism respecting its treatment of the significance of conception. To
convince a court of the merits in this analysis, the genetically
damaged plaintiff must show that life is traceable to points before
conception and, therefore, that conception is merely a point, albeit
an essential one, in a continuum. It is thus unjust to condition the
right to be born sound, which all infants are to enjoy, on that
"chunk" of pre-birth existence in which they were injured.
The probability of establishing the sufficiency of the preconcep-
tion injury action under each of the three existing theories is at best
minute. Under each of these theories, injuries are compensable only
when sustained after a specified point in pre-birth existence. With
even the more liberal theories affording protection only after the
87. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 853, cert. denied,
370 U.S. 945 (1963).
88. Id.
89. R. MUTUNGI. THE RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN CHILD AND MINORS, 4 (Kenya,
1973).
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moment of conception, the genetically damaged plaintiff will
presumably need to justify submission of his action to the jury on
other grounds. The following discussion explores several cases
which may prove of precedential value to the preconception injury
cause of action.
CASE AUTHORITY FOR THE GENETICALLY DAMAGED PLAINTIFF
Although an action for negligently inflicted preconception in-
juries has not yet been reported in the United States, there are
several cases with closely analogous factual situations. Morgan v.
U.S." was the first reported case involving physical injuries caused
by a defendant's negligent conduct before the plaintiff-child's con-
ception. The Morgan complaint, brought in 1956 under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, alleged that as the result of a negligent blood
transfusion performed on the mother prior to the plaintiffs concep-
tion, the plaintiff-child born in 1955 suffered serious injuries."1 The
New Jersey District Court granted the United States' motion to
dismiss holding that no action accrued to the infant who was neither
a viable fetus nor even conceived at the time of the negligent
transfusion."
In denying the cause of action, the Morgan court relied on
Berlin v. J.C. Penny Co.,Inc.," which has been described as "a relic
harkening back to Victorian antiquarian law and medicine which
denied all remedy for prenatal injury."" The decision in Morgan
stands, but not the precedent on which it relied. Berlin was "em-
phatically overruled" in 1960 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 5
Futhermore, each of the cases on which Berlin relied were also
subsequently overruled."
Even had the Morgan court permitted this action, its decision
would not be of persuasive precedential value to future pre-
conception injury cases. Morgan was not, strictly speaking, a
preconception injury action, rather it involved preconception
negligent conduct giving rise to prenatal injuries. Although the
defendant-hospital's negligent conduct occurred before the plaintiff-
child's conception, she sustained no injuries from the blood transfu-
90. 143 F. Supp. 580 (D.N.J. 1965).
91. Id at 581.
92. Id at 584.
93. 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 23 (1940).
94. 19 A.T.L.A. L. REP. 237 (Oct. 1976).
95. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
96. See note 94 supra.
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sion given her mother until after conception when the wrong type
blood came into contact with the developing fetus." Thus, unlike a
preconception injury case where both negligent conduct and damage
occur before the plaintiffs conception, the child in Morgan sustained
no damage until after conception.
In dismissing the plaintiff-child's complaint, the Morgan court
considered neither the merits nor problems in permitting the
preconception injury action to reach the jury. Later that same year
the concurring justice in Hornbuckle v. Plantation Piper Line Co."
presented two inherent difficulties with maintenence of the
preconception injury cause of action.
In Hornbuckle a pregnant woman and her non-viable fetus
were injured in an automobile accident as the result of defendant's
negligence. The Hornbuckle majority rejected the requirement that
the unborn child be quick at the time of injury and held, "if a child
born after an injury sustained at any period of its prenatal life can
prove the effect on it of a tort, it would have a right to recover.""
The concurring justice, fearful of the implications of the majority's
holding and concerned over the ramifications of allowing preconcep-
tion injury actions cautioned:
The rule of the majority.., simply bypasses the inflexible
rule of law that for one to maintain a suit for personal in-
jury, the injury must be either to the person of the suit or
that of a relative or one upon whom he is dependent. The
indispensable requisite is completely absent here. The cell
is not the person of anyone, and whether it becomes such
is dependent upon the process of nature which raises it
from a mere cell to a human being .... If a baby can sue
for injuries sustained five seconds after conception, as the
majority rules, why not allow such suits for injuries
before conception, even unto the third and fourth genera-
tions?1"°
97. Estep & Forgetson, Legal Liability For Genetic Injuries From Radiation,
24 LA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1963). Morgan involved preconception impact but not preconcep-
tion injuries -injuries in the case of improper blood transfusions producing Rh or
other blood group antibodies in the mother, unlike genetic injuries resulting from the
effects of a preconception act, the injury in fact occurring after the maternal an-
tibodies have been transferred to the developing fetus where they affect the fetal
blood.
98. 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.W.2d 727 (1956).
99. I& at 728.
100. Id at 729.
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The concurring opinion introduces two grounds for dismissing the
preconception injury action: (1) compensable physical injuries may
be sustained only by "persons," the definition of which, according to
the concurring justice, does not include the fetal cell much less the
parental gene, and (2) the possibility of "very" stale claims. Similar
to both the biological-separability and viability theories, emphasis
was thus placed on the point before birth at which the unborn child
becomes a legal "person."
Unlike the concurring justice in Hornbuckle, the court in
Zepeda v. Zepeda,"'0 flatly refused to pick a point before birth at
which to attach legal personality. Rather than establishing a point at
which the fetal cell becames a "person" capable of tort compensa-
tion, the Zepeda court emphasized the unborn child's "capacity for
independent existence.""2 In the context of three hypotheticals, it
was found that the time of injury-after, at or before conception -
was immaterial.1 0 3 Personhood at the moment of injury was viewed
as irrelevant to the child's cause of action; what was important was
that
[t]he plaintiff is a person now and he was a potential per-
son ... at the time of the original wrong. As he developed
biologically from potentiality to reality the wrong
developed too. It progressed as did he, from essence to ex-
istence. When he became a person the nature of the
wrong became fixed.'"
The Zepeda court, therefore, avoided such absolutes as viability and
conception and critized previous attempts to distinguish the day-to-
day development of life.' 1" Existence before birth is a process and as
such is inherently incapable of judicial divisions into protected and
unprotected segments.'"6
With the benefit of the dicta provided in Hornbuckle and
Zepeda outlining the problems and merits of the preconception in-
jury action, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Jorgensen
101. 42 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1963).
102. Id. at 855.
103. Id. at 853-54. The Zepeda court emphasized "it makes no difference how
much time elapses between a wrongful act and a resulting injury if there is a causal
relation between them." Id
104. Id at 855.
105. Id. at 853. "How can the law distinguish the day to day development of
life? ... There cannot be absolutes in the minute to minute progress of life from sperm
and ovum to cell, to embryo to foetus, to child." Id.
106. Id
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v. Meade Johnson Laboratories.0 " A Mongoloid child brought this ac-
tion in strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligence for
preconception injuries resulting from her mother's use of defen-
dant's oral contraceptive product which allegedly altered the
mother's chromosome structure.'O" The court vacated and remanded
the district court's holding that recovery for preconception injuries
lay with the legislature, not the courts.' Jorgenson was not,
however, a negligently inflicted preconception injury action for the
Tenth Circuit apparently recognized the child's claim on the basis of
strict liability principles:
If the view prevailed that tortious conduct occurring prior
to conception is not actionable in behalf of an infant suf-
fering personal injury from a defective food product
manufactured before his conception, [he] would be without
remedy ....
We are persuaded that the Oklahoma courts would treat
the problem here as one of causation and proximate cause,
to be determined by competent medical proof. And such
treatment of the problem would accord with the predomi-
nant view that an action may be maintained for prenatal
injuries negligently inflicted if the injured child is born
alive."
Like Zepeda, the Jorgensen court placed little emphasis on the point
before birth at which injuries attach. The significance of Jorgensen
is, nevertheless, diminished in the present concern not only because
it can arguably be labelled as a strict liability case, but because the
complaint alleged an injury to a viable fetus."' Thus, in construing
the pleadings most favorably to the plainfiff, the Jorgenson court
was not compelled to limit its ruling to the damages sustained
before conception."2
Relying on Jorgensen, an Illinois appellate court in Renslow v.
Mennonite Hospital"' permitted in 1976 what was incorrectly inter-
preted by some"' to be a preconception injury action. In a factual
107. 336 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacated and remanded, 483 F.2d 237
(10th Cir. 1973).
108. Id. at 238-39.
109. Id. at 241.
110. Id. at 240.
111. Id. at 239.
112. Id.
113. 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
114. 19 A.T.L.A. L. REP. 237 (Oct. 1976).
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situation quite similiar to Morgan, Renslow involved injuries to a
child as the result of defendant-hospital's negligent blood transfu-
sion given to her mother eight years before the plaintiff-child's con-
ception."'1 The Renslow court, like Zepeda and Jorgensen, was not
concerned with the point in time of the defendant's negligent con-
duct. Indeed, in the context of a short paragraph, the Renslow court
dismissed defendant's contention that they owed the unborn child no
duty of care prior to conception: "There has been no showing that
the defendant's could not reasonably have foreseen that the [mother]
would later marry and bear a child and that the child would be in-
jured as a result of the improper blood transfusion." ' Nevertheless,
two aspects of Renslow lessen its precedential value to the action
for negligently inflicted preconception injuries. First, even though
interpreted to the contrary,"7 Renslow, like Morgan, involved
preconception negligent conduct causing prenatal injuries. Although
the defendant-hospital's negligent conduct occurred long before con-
ception, the plaintiff-child in both Renslow and Morgan was not
damaged until after conception when the transfused blood first came
into contact with the developing fetus. And second, the Renslow
court in allowing the cause of action correctly construed the
pleadings to have alleged post-conception injuries."
Later that same year, the most closely analogous case to the
preconception injury action was decided in Park v. Chessin.' 9 The
parents of a congenitally deformed child brought action on the
child's behalf for the alleged malpractice of medical specialists in
counseling them respecting the safety in conceiving a second child."
The parents had previously bore a congenitally deformed child and
had consulted the specialists for advice as to whether another child
would suffer similar congenital ailments. The specific negligence
which the complaint alleged was: "That defendants failed to take
tests to ascertain the chromosomal and/or genital makeup of the
mother and father so as to ascertain the possibilities and pro-
babilities on a rational basis of any (future deformed child)."'' The
complaint sought damages for the child's "pain and suffering
resulting from her birth in violation of her claimed right not to be
115. 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870, 871 (1976).
116. I1& at 874.
117. See note 114 supra.
118. 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870, 872 (1976).
119. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Super Ct. 1976), affd, 46 U.S.L.W. 2326
(Dec. 12, 1977).
120. I& at 206-207.
121. Id
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conceived and therefore not to be born."'" In recognizing the
plaintiff-child's cause of action, the Park court concluded:
Once having been born alive, particularly where, as here,
the child was foreseeable and within the comtemplation of
the defendants, where defendants are claimed to have
been aware of or should have been aware of the danger
that said child might or would be born with such defects
and malady, said child assuredly comes within the "orbit
of the danger" for which defendants could be held liable.1"
The Park court did construe the pleadings as having alleged
preconception injuries and its decision is clearly good law for future
proconception injury actions. The decision may, nevertheless, be
distinguished to the extent that the medical specialist's diagonosis
did not cause the preconception injuries, but rather permitted the
deformed child to be conceived and born. ' Still, like Renslow, Park
clearly stands for the principle that the specialists owe the unborn
child a duty of reasonable care before conception.
It is apparent that these cases do not establish persuasive
precedents either for or against the preconception injury action. The
diametrically opposed dicta in Zepeda and Hornbuckle most succinc-
tly presents the ultimate issue which must be resolved in future
preconception negligent injury cases; that is, whether or not courts
should establish inflexible rules whereby a point before birth is pick-
ed at which injuries become compensable. The central focus in the
following section is whether injuries must occur to a "person" to be
compensable, or whether the potential person can also be owed a du-
ty of care.
THE QUEST FOR LEGAL PERSONALITY IN THE UNBORN - SHOULD IT
CONTINUE?
For nearly a century, the recurrent theme in all but the most
rare pre-birth injury cases has been the importance of when the un-
born child sustains negligently inflicted injuries.' Under existing
theories, courts have consistently attempted to divide pre-birth ex-
istence into protected and unprotected segments." A few courts
122. Id.
123. Id. at 210.
124. Park may, therefore, be labelled a preconception tort resulting in a
wrongful life suit. Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56
NEB. L. REV. 706, 712 (1977).
125. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 336.
126. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 855, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1963).
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and commentators have, nevertheless, refused to reach determina-
tions of duty to unborn children via acquiescent applications of ex-
isting theories which confer legal personality on the unborn child on-
ly after specified points before birth.
The first American court to allow a cause of action to be stated
for prenatal injuries purposely avoided "a consideration of the legal
status of the fetus and (looked instead) to the causual link between
the infant's condition and the defendant's wrongful conduct.""' That
Pennyslvania court in Kline v. Zuckerman concluded:
The right of recovery can also be supported upon another
ground, which eliminates the necessity of considering the
legal status of the unborn. Liability for personal injuries
is dependent in the law of negligence upon the presence of
two factors: namely, first negligence on the part of the
person setting a harmful force in motion, and, second, the
resultant injury to an individual. The absence of either
factor will defeat recovery. The time which elapses bet-
ween the negligent act which puts harmful forces in mo-
tion and the receipt of the injury by the person injured is
of no consequence, except as it may have an evidential
value in a dispute as to cause and effect."
Under Kline the point in time at which the unborn child received his
injuries was a relevant, but not the sole, consideration in
establishing the existence or non-existence of duty and a cause of ac-
tion. Thus, more than twenty years before Bonbrest began the
avalanche of prenatal injury recovery, Kline initiated the extremely
important distinction between protecton of fetal rights as opposed
to the interests of the live child from risks of pre-birth injuries. By
avoiding considerations of when rights attach to the unborn child,
the Kline court avoided resolving the inherently divergent views of
the doctor, theologian, philosopher and utilitarian as to when life
begins.'"
Although Kline has received little or no attention, its reasoning
may be resurrected in light of the Supreme Court's recent pro-
nouncements in Roe v. Wade."' As previously discussed"' the vast
127. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976)(Ap-
pellant's Brief at 14).
128. 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 231 (C.D. 1924).
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1972).
130. Id.
131. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
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majority of courts considering prenatal injury causes of action have
struggled to determine the moment before birth at which legal per-
sonality attaches to the unborn child. Roe predictably has ended this
search for as the Court stated:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at
any concensus, the judiciary, at this point in the develop-
ment of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate
as to the answer . . . . In short, the unborn have never
been recognized . . . in the law as persons in the whole
sense.
It remains to be seen whether this dicta in Roe has ended the ninety
year quest for legal personality in the unborn. The Court never-
theless clearly acknowledges the futility in searching.
Even prior to Roe the English Law Commission, in the context
of finding that "a child who is born disabled because of some tor-
tious injury inflicted upon its parent before conception should have
a remedy," ' refused to search for legal personality in the unborn:
[We] should deal with the rights of a living person rather
than the rights of the fetus .... For there to be any cause
of action there must be live birth. The cause of action can
be said to crystallize at birth. A developing common law
points towards this result .... [T]here is nothing repug-
nant to common law principles in fixing the date of injury
at a point, live birth, necessarily later than both the
negligent act causing the injury and the event or ocur-
rence resulting from that act and damaging the foetus. To
look back from the fact of live birth with injury to the
fault causing the injury is consistent with the common
law.' "
By "looking back" from live birth, the Law Commission suggests
that the unborn be judicially protected, not merely after conception
or viability, but during the entire continuum of pre-birth ex-
istence." Logically, is it not, "naive for a community to grant legal
132. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156, 162 (1972).
133. ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION. Working Paper No. 60-Injuries to Unborn
Children § 78 (1974).
134. Id at §32.
135. Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1977], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss1/5
PRECONCEPTION INJURIES
protections in some stages of one's life-span and not in the entire
continuum?""' Recognition of legal personality only during portions
of pre-birth existence according to existing theories has been best
criticized as follows: "How can the law distinguish the day to day
development of life? ... There cannot be absolutes in the minute to
minute progess of life from sperm and ovum to cell, to embryo to
foetus, to child."'87 By fixing points in pre-birth existence before
which the unborn child is "free-game," the theories which have
evolved in American courts most emphatically do distinguish por-
tions of life's developmental process.
Upon closer scrutiny, the search under existing theories for
legal personality in unborn children can also lead to irresolvable con-
flicts. One important inconsistency becomes apparant when the un-
born child dies from his pre-birth injuries. Although the majority of
courts cloak the unborn child with legal personality during part of
pre-birth existence, few cases"N can be found in which the prenatally
damaged child was permitted to maintain a cause of action before
live birth. With extremely few courts allowing a wrongful death ac-
tion to be stated for the unborn child's pre-viable death, none of the
existing theories can adequately or logically explain the effect on
legal personality when the unborn child dies before viability from
prenatal injuries. Thus, legal status has absolutely no significance
unless the unborn child survives his pre-birth environment or at
least attains the status of viability.'" Certainly, the unborn child's
legal status does not magically vanish when a defendant is "for-
tunate" enough to kill instead of maim him. Although all elements of
a negligent tort are present, the cause of action disappears at
previability death. A second conflict surfaces in a case in which the
unborn child sustains pre-birth injury near the time of his concep-
tion. It is significant to note that conception, like viability, should be
viewed more as a process over time than an event."' Whether in-
juries sustained during this process will be compensable under
American theories is, therefore, patently irresolvable. A final ques-
tion may be directed at the biological-separability theory."' Is there
136. R. MUTINGi. THE RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN CHILD AND MINORS 5 (Kenya 1974).
137. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Il. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 855, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1963).
138. See generally 15 A.L.R.3d 922 (1967); Brantley, Wrongful Birth: The
Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140 (1976).
139. Id.
140. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1972).
141. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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separability and a fortioii duty when identical twins are injured in
the womb before cellular division? The twins are conceived, yet by
definition they are one."a Certainly the fact that these twins enjoyed
the first few moments of their post-conception existence "with" one
another should not render them inseparable and, therefore, "fair-
game" for the tortfeasor.
An even more basic inconsistency under existing theories is
that preconception injury cases will be dismissed for lack of duty
although such injuries are potentially foreseeable. Leading
authorities in negligent tort law agree that the foreseeability test",
142. See generally Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law
Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554 (1962).
143. A duty in negligence cases may be defined as "an obligation to which the
law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct
toward another." PROSSER, supra note 2, at 324. Frequently duty serves as justification
for a finding or refusal to find the plaintiffs interest to be protected against the defen-
dant's injurious conduct. Because of the inherent variability of duty conceptualizations,
courts are blessed with a flexible gauge that will frequently serve as a mere justifica-
tion for more basic reactions: "[T]he problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of
negligence, and . . . no universal test for it has been formulated. It is a shorthand
statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself Id. at 325. When one
negligently starts a fire the typical court today will refuse to hold him liable for the
destruction of a house miles away. See, e.g., Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Co., 224
N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918); O'Neill v. New York, 0. & W. R. Co., 115 N.Y. 579, 22 N.E.
217 (1889). The conclusion will be stated in terms of duty. Underlying that determina-
tion are the myriad of variable factors which actually explain the refusal to permit the
jury to consider liability.
Since 1928 the typical decision in which duty analysis is warranted will be phras-
ed in terms of foreseeability. In that year Justice Cardozo wrote Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), in which he held:
Negligence was a matter of relation between the parties, which must be
founded upon the foreseeability of harm to the person in fact injured. The
defendant's conduct was not a wrong toward [the plaintiff] merely because
it was negligence toward someone else. [Plaintiff] must sue in her own
right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a
breach of duty to another.
Id at 100. Since Palsgraf many courts have phrased their answer as to whether the
plaintiffs interests are entitled to judicial protection from the defendant's conduct, in
terms of foreseeability. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497
(1935); Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937); Blanchard v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 71 Ga. App. 843, 32 S.E.2d 420 (1944); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 470,
86 A.2d 879 (1952). Recognizing the difficulty in adequately interpreting Cardozo's
foreseeability test, one author has attempted to explain Palsgraf as follows:
Perhaps it is attempting to reduce the irreducible, but it seems fair to say
. . .that there are just two basic questions: (1) is the wrongdoing defen-
dant liable only for those kinds of injury which would be reasonably
foreseeable; and (2) is the defendant liable only to those plaintiffs injured
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contains no requirement that at the time of the defendant's tortious
conduct, the plaintiff be in existence.'" Some authorities have noted
that, "the limitation of the Palsgraf case contains no requirment
that the interests within the range of peril be known or identified in
the actor's mind, or even be in existence at the time of the
negligence."'145 Others have emphasized that plaintiffs should recover
for personal injuries although at the time of another's negligent con-
duct, "these may be unknown or unknowable persons."'"" These
authorities have, therefore, suggested that a duty of care can be ow-
ed to one who does not "exist." This is precisely the case in a
preconception injury action. The obvious implication is that the
preconceived child could be foreseeably endangered by one's
negligent conduct. Indeed, even more provocative is the argument
that it is more foreseeable that a child will be born of the woman in
the orbit of the danger than that this woman is in fact already preg-
nant. The unborn child's "non-existence" before conception arguably
should not, therefore, render him unforeseeable and unprotected.
Renslow' 7 and Park'" have substantiated the views of these
legal commentators that one may owe a duty of care to the unborn
before conception. Notably, the defendants in both of these cases
were doctors or medical experts and, therefore, would have been
held to a specialist's standard of care.' Duty was nevertheless
by his wrongdoing who he reasonably could have foreseen might be in-
jured.
ATOMS, supra note 8, at 92.
The dissenting justice in Palsgraf took a much less restrictive view of the scope
of duty. Justice Andrews posited that each owes a duty of reasonable conduct to all
and concluded, "not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected
to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally
be thought the danger zone." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99,
106 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
The cases to which Palsgraf is appropriate precedent seem to have accepted
Cardozo's theory over Andrews'. It is questionable whether the preconception injury
action is governed by Palsgraf as the foreseeability with which Cardozo was apparent-
ly addressing was in respect to physical distances and not time elements. Assuming
arguendo that Palsgraf does contain precedential value, the plaintiff in the preconcep-
tion injury action will need to establish that at the time of the defendant's tortious
conduct it was foreseeable that a future person would sustain genetic damage.
144. HARPER & JAMES. 2 Law of Torts § 18.3 (1956).
145. 1I
146. Seavey, Book Review, 45 HARv. L. REV. 209, 210 (1971).
147. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
148. Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Super Ct. 1976), affd,
46 U.S.L.W. 2396 (Dec. 12, 1977). See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
149. PROSSER, supra note 2, at § 32.
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found and the respective defendants were held responsible for acts
done long before the future plaintiff-child's conception. 15
In conclusion, it would appear that the search for legal per-
sonality in the unborn should end. To the extent that theories which
confer legal status on the unborn for mere portions of pre-birth ex-
istence are subject to attack as unnecessary, illogical, and inconsis-
tant, they should be reappraised. As one author states:
If the science of genetics develops to the point where
causation can be proved, logic would seem to call for
recovery for preconception injuries on the same grounds
suggested for post-conception injuries in radiation cases.
The concept of a separate legal entity should not be an
obstacle if compensation is accepted as the theory for tort
recovery. So long as the defendant is protected against
unreasonable claims by placing a substantial burden of
proof upon the plaintiff there is no reason to immunize the
wrongdoing defendant from liability for actual injuries
which result from his negligence.'51
CONCLUSION
For almost a century American courts have determined the ex-
istence of duty to unborn children via three theories which divide
"life" before birth into protected and unprotected segments.'"
Depending on the particular theory which a jurisdiction follows, the
unborn child will be owed a duty of care only after the moment of
viability or conception. These points in time before birth were
chosen historically on the basis of the unborn child's separability
from his mother.'" Thus, only when shown to be separable will the
unborn child be judicially protected from negligent conduct with the
cloak of legal personality and be owed a duty of care.
Faced with such inflexible "point-picking" theories, the
genetically damaged plaintiff has little hope of establishing duty and
the sufficiency of his cause of action. If he is to reach the jury with
his causation and negligence arguments, the plaintiff-child alleging
preconception injuries must resort to such revolutionary
150. In Renslow the court found that the defendant-hospital breached a duty
owed the plaintiff-child eight years before his conception. In Park the court found that
the defendant-doctor breached a duty owed the plaintiff-child several months before
her conception.
151. ATOMS, supra note 7, at 232-233.
152. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
153. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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developments as cloning or test tube babies in order to show his re-
quisite separability. ' The chance for judicial acceptance of such
tenuous arguments is at best minute.
Likewise, the small amount of legal precedent respecting
preconception injuries presents only minor assistance to the
genetically damaged plaintiffs cause of action.' Indeed, with the
first true negligently inflicted preconception injury case yet to arise,
the only indication of how courts will respond to this unique action
is found in dicta.
Nevertheless blanket dismissal of all preconception injury
cases does not seem well founded. Judicial treatment of the pre-
birth injury tort is subject to several basic criticisms.'" In attemp-
ting to grant legal personality to the unborn under existing theories
only after specified points in time before birth, courts are forced to
"distinguish the day-to-day development of life"'57 and resolve the ir-
resoluble question of when life begins.'" With their inconsistencies
apparent on closer scrutiny, existing theories are also subject to at-
tack as illogical. Courts accepting present theories have, for exam-
ple, cornered themselves into dismissing all preconception injury
cases even though such injuries may be clearly foreseeable.
Roe' has, hopefully, ended the ninety year search for legal
personality in the unborn. Indeed, logic would seem to dictate that
courts discontinue the futile rhetoric respecting fetal rights and
direct judicial energy toward the protection of living children from
risks of injury before birth. Only then will determinations of duty be
made on a case-by-case analysis rather than under inflexible theories
which prevent a court from considering the merits of individual
preconception injury cases and thereby preclude the genetically
damaged plaintiff from establishing the sufficiency of his cause of ac-
tion. In short, historical rules which absolutely preclude
maintenance of potentially meritorious claims warrant re-evaluation.
This re-evalutation of existing theories is of immediate impor-
tance:
154. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
155. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
156. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
157. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 IIl. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, 855, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1963).
158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1972).
159. ld..
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The 20th century legal profession [must move] quickly to
guide the adjustment of the law [and] be prepared to
modify existing rules and to assist in the formulating of
new doctrines to meet the unique problems which are cer-
tain to arise.'"
It remains to be seen how our judicial system will respond to the
preconceived injury tort and whether a duty to unborn, unconceived
children will be found. Hopefully the creative continuity.' which
characterized judicial treatment of prenatal injuries in recognizing a
duty at points closer and closer to the moment of conception, will
continue beyond.
160. ATOMS, supra note 7, at 3.
161. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463
(1962).
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